A Great New Idea from Pedal Power

The Electricity-Generating Bicycle Desk That Would Power the World

The story of Pedal Power’s bike machine is spreading quickly. The two-man company has more than tripled its crowd-sourced fundraising goal, and its bike desk is being used to power laptops, grind grain for beer, and churn butter.
JAMES HAMBLINJAN 7 2014, 1:38 PM ET

Does one of your colleagues have a standing desk? Maybe even a treadmill desk? Do they talk about how it’s adding years to their life, enhancing both productivity and the richness and clarity if their skin? Do they ask you about how uncomfortable it must be to sit all day? You want to wipe the smug superiority off their face once and for all? But not in a violent way. Too much at stake. This time it can’t be violent.

How about beating them at their own game. Rising above is for people who can’t compete. Show up at the office one day with this handmade bicycle desk that generates power — enough to run your computer or charge your phone, sure, but also enough to mill grain, churn your own butter, run an industrial sewing machine, or split a dang log. Watch it split a log.

Yes, it is loud. The designers are working on a version with rubber belts for an office setting. But then, how would people know you are splitting the office logs?

Pedal Power is a tiny start-up (two guys) based in Essex, New York. A few weeks ago, photos of their bike machine spread widely across the Internet. “With an efficiency of 97 percent, bicycle technology is nearly perfect,” they wrote in their pitch. “So why do we use it only for transportation?”

Or, even more wastefully, for spin classes or SoulCycle. That is kinetic energy just floating up into ether and steam and sweaty song. It’s like pouring crude oil down the drain. The Internet agreed. Last week their Kickstarter campaign reached its $10,000 goal. Today it’s over $30,000. This week they begin work on open-source plans; the stated goal of the crowd-funded project.

I spoke with the co-founders of Pedal Power, Andy Wekin and Steve Blood last week. Wekin is the mechanical engineer, and Blood describes himself as “the computer programming guy” who handles most of the business side. I asked what they’re going to do with all of that money.

“So, if you open source your design for the bikes,” I said, “and everyone starts building their own, then you won’t sell any?”

“Well, most people don’t know how to weld,” Blood said.

“It’s an interesting business case. With a tiny little project like this, it’s about getting out there. Andy and I both have inclinations toward the open-source world. Given that we’re never going to be a business with a million-dollar marketing budget, we figured if we could open source the design and there were 50 or 100 people around the world who go and build it, they would all be ambassadors for us,” Blood said. “So here’s a way we can market this cheaply and with a lot of goodwill.”

Last year a company called FitDesk kindly sent me a bicycle desk. I liked the concept and worked on it for a bit, but it was lightweight and wobbly. I could read on it for about 20 minutes before I started to get a headache.

Wekin and Blood thought of that.

“Our first prototype was considerably more wobbly than we expected.” Now the machines are substantial.

Working at my bike desk also left me sweaty. Not immediately, and even though I wasn’t pedaling hard, but surreptitiously sweaty. The kind of heat that comes on slowly, and then you have a meeting and everyone is asking if you’re okay.

“Could one power a laptop in a coffee shop without sweating through their shirt?”

“Yep, not a problem.”

Talking more to Wekin and Blood, it becomes clear that Pedal Power isn’t really about selling a lot of bikes. It’s also not even really about or exercise or workplace superiority. It’s about our relationship with energy.

“I would love to see Pedal Power machines in every coffee shop in every city in the country,” Blood said in their Kickstarter video, “So that people who are working on their laptops, working on their iPads, are at the same time generating their own power for those devices. I want to connect people to the energy they use. I want people to understand how precious energy is, and how hard it is to come by.”

“If everyone in the United States could ride on one of these things and feel what it’s like to turn on the TV, or flip on the light switch, or turn on a video game,” Wekin told Fast Company, “I think it would change how we use energy. We self-flagellate sometimes about our carbon footprint, but we don’t even realize what that means.”

Chrissy Raudonis, also of Essex, uses Pedal Power to grind soy grains for her chickens every morning. “We have it in there on a coarse setting,” she explained, “because chickens can’t eat the whole grain.” For her there’s art in keeping the blow of incoming beans apace with her pedaling.

“It’s easy to want to go too fast on it,” she said, “and have grain just splattering everywhere. It makes me feel different about my relationship to the work that I’m doing, and makes me feel good that I can get some exercise and produce a valuable product.”

“In the desk world,” Welkin said, “There are people sitting at desks all day who would like to be more active, and that’s one side aspect. That’s one potential market for ours. But we feel ours is also doing useful work. That’s the most important function. Developing nations and people who are living off the grid; small farms and business that are trying to be energy-independent. There’s one group called Maya Pedal in Guatemala that is doing great work, taking old bikes from the U.S. and turning them into machines to help pump water, blend food. It’s amazing work that they’re doing. We’d love to be able to get our machines out there.”

Wekin said they have already been contacted by a local government official in India who is interested in using their machines to pump water for irrigation.

They have also had parents semi-jokingly talk about making their kids pedal for their video game time.

The plans will be available in the coming months. Wekin and Blood are starting work this week. They also sold eight machines during the Kickstarter. Only eight? Well, they cost $2,400, plus shipping.

“We’ve been a little bit surprised by the media attention,” Blood said. “We’re just a couple of guys who live in a small town in upstate New York.”

Yes, two guys who built a bicycle desk that helps people understand their place in the world. And splits logs.

Just What the GOP Needs

2014’s Weirdest GOP Primary: Santa vs. Scrooge
In Michigan, “foreclosure king” David Trott is vying to unseat former Santa impersonator Kerry Bentivolio. Let the reindeer games begin.
—By Tim Murphy | Mon Jan. 6, 2014 6:34 AM GMT

In a year where business-friendly Republicans are lining up to challenge tea party renegades, the GOP primary in Michigan’s 11th District defies political convention. In one corner is freshman Rep. Kerry Bentivolio—a former Santa impersonator and reindeer rancher who was elected almost by accident last fall after the five-term incumbent abruptly quit. In the other is David Trott, a lawyer who has been dubbed the “foreclosure king” of a state in which 38 percent of mortgages are underwater.

“It’s one of the oddest primaries probably in the country,” says Bill Ballenger, a former Republican state senator who runs the site Inside Michigan Politics.

If Bentivolio is Santa, Trott’s political rivals are working to frame the challenger as something closer to Scrooge. “Whether or not we want to make an issue of it, his record is representing most of the major Wall Street banks and kicking people out of homes in the district,” says Bentivolio’s campaign manager, David Wolkinson. “I mean, this is where he made his money.”

Trott’s campaign notes that the candidate has a wide array of business interests, but his financial disclosure forms leave no doubt that foreclosures are where he made his fortune. Through various interconnected concerns, Trott is involved in virtually every aspect of the foreclosure business.

His flagship operation is Trott & Trott, a 500-person law firm founded by his father that is one of the largest foreclosure specialists in the state; its clients are largely lenders, such as Bank of America and Countrywide. Trott & Trott doesn’t personally evict homeowners; it handles the paperwork for banks that do. “It’s what we do; it’s all we’ve ever done,” Trott said in a 2007 TV interview, of his foreclosure work.

He also owns a real estate firm that manages foreclosed properties, as well as a newspaper chain, Michigan Legal News, that banks are required to post foreclosure notices in.

Trott doesn’t just benefit from foreclosures; his firm has pushed to change state law to make it easier for banks to kick people out of their homes. The Michigan Messenger, a now-defunct investigative reporting site, reported in 2009 that Trott & Trott representatives had worked with Republican legislators to rewrite foreclosure reform legislation in order to narrow the window for residents to appeal their foreclosures. The firm directed a request for comment to the Trott campaign, which said in a statement: “Trott and Trott was one of several entities that was asked for input which they gave.”

In 2011, Trott’s law firm sparked a local backlash when it facilitated the eviction of 101-year-old Texana Hollis, whose belongings were unceremoniously deposited in a dumpster. (Hollis’ son had fallen behind on property tax payments and ignored repeated warnings from his bank.) Hollis was eventually allowed to stay in her Detroit home of 58 years after a public outcry spurred Detroit Free-Press columnist Mitch Albom to buy the property through a charity.

So notorious is the Trott brand in southeast Michigan that when activists wanted to protest evictions in 2013, they didn’t set up “Hoovervilles,” the Depression-era encampments inspired by the president—they created “Trottvilles.”

“David’s firm has made a living off of monetizing human misery here in Michigan,” said Curtis Hertel Jr., a register of deeds in Ingham County, just outside the 11th District, who has challenged Trott & Trott in court. “I mean you go through all the different scandals that have happened with the banks, and the robosigning documents, and everything else—these people are on the front lines of that.”

Stu Sandler, a Trott campaign spokesman, responds: “Dave Trott represents clients who don’t want to foreclose on people if they can avoid it. The firm works on loan modifications, they work on short sales. No one wants to foreclose on people, but that’s part of the economy we live in.”

Sandler concedes that Trott’s foreclosure work will be a campaign issue, but says the critique put forth by Hertel, Wolkinson, and others is just faux populism. “Several of Dave Trott’s opponents are not job creators, they’ve never created a job, and the only thing they can do to distract from discussing the economy is use smear tactics,” he says.

The primary comes as Republicans in Michigan are looking to reinvent themselves in the Rust Belt. Kentucky Sen. Rand Paul visited Detroit last month to open a new GOP office aimed at recruiting African American voters. But Bentivolio is an unusual alternative for Republicans turned off by how Trott made his money. The onetime Santa impersonator brought several tons of personal baggage to Washington in his sleigh.

His professional history is rife with controversy. An invitation to appear at the White House with his reindeer in the 1990s was scuttled when a creditor blasted him in the press, citing a $620,000 tab he’d rung up in a failed home-building venture. He filed for bankruptcy after the project flopped and rebounded with a quixotic business raising reindeers for use in Christmas festivals. In a defamation lawsuit against the creditor, Bentivolio admitted that the task of working as a Santa impersonator had begun to get to him. “I have a problem figuring out which one I really am, Santa Claus or Kerry Bentivolio,” he said in a deposition. “All my life I have been told I’m Kerry Bentivolio, and now, I am a Santa Claus, so now I prefer to be Santa Claus.”

In 2011, after returning from a tour in Iraq with the Michigan Army Reserve, he took a job as an English teacher at a local high school. The job was short lived. He parted ways after the school’s administration reprimanded him for telling students his goal was to make each of them cry and that they were “just a paycheck.” He also costarred in a low-budget film in which George W. Bush has direct knowledge of the 9/11 attacks before they happen.

Bentivolio was elected in a fluke. In the spring of 2012, Rep. Thad McCotter (R-Mich.), the district’s five-term incumbent, abruptly dropped out of the race and resigned, after allegations of petition fraud. This left Bentivolio—running as a gadfly with no realistic chance at winning—as the only candidate on the Republican primary ballot. A state senator launched a write-in campaign, but Bentivolio received $500,000 from a super-PAC manned by two libertarian twentysomethings (10 times more money than he had raised) and cruised to victory.

Democrats, who had fielded only token opposition expecting to face the popular McCotter, never put up much of a fight that fall. This time around, Democrats have coalesced around Bobby McKenzie, a former State Department counterterrorism official. He has at least a puncher’s chance: Mitt Romney carried the district by just 4 points in 2012.

Bentivolio’s first term has been mostly uneventful, with a few exceptions. In September, he promised attendees at a GOP event in Birmingham, Michigan, that he would hold a hearing on the government’s use of airplane exhaust (i.e. “chemtrails”) to poison Michiganders and make them more docile. A Bentivolio spokesman later said the proposed hearing had been canceled for lack of evidence. In August, he told a group of constituents that it would be a “dream come true” to file impeachment papers against President Obama—but again backed off, for lack of evidence. “You’re going to become a laughingstock if you’ve submitted a bill to impeach the president,” he said, “because No. 1, you’ve got to convince the press.”

Asked about his calls for impeachment and the chemtrails hearing, Bentivolio’s spokesman said the candidate’s proposals shouldn’t always be taken seriously. “The congressman likes to say there’s three things in Washington you’ll never find—honesty, common sense, and a sense of humor,” Wolkinson says. “He definitely has a sense of humor.”

Still, he’s received the support of the House leadership in his reelection fight. House Speaker John Boehner traveled to Michigan to attend a fundraiser for Bentivolio in August, and Majority Leader Eric Cantor’s PAC gave the freshman congressman’s campaign coffers a $10,000 boost. But for the most part, Bentivolio’s fundraising has been paltry. He’s raised just $39,000. According to the most recent Federal Elections Commission filings, Trott had $450,000 on hand, thanks in part to a $250,000 donation from himself. He also received the maximum donation from billionaire Dick DeVos, whose family has poured big bucks into returning the Michigan GOP to power.

Unlike his rival, Trott has strong connections in GOP fundraising circles. He was a member of Mitt Romney’s Michigan finance committee in 2012, and a donor to the pro-Romney super-PAC Restore Our Future, to which Trott & Trott gave $200,000.

The first poll of the race gave Bentivolio a 19-point lead over Trott, but that was in September before either candidate began advertising.

“Bentivolio may have said some kooky things,” says Ballenger, the former state senator. “He’s done stuff to keep his previous image alive, but if you actually look at his voting patterns, most of the time they’re not totally far-out or weird.” In a race that defies stereotypes, that may be the strangest thing.

Remembrances of Times Past

AT 407: MY GRANDFATHER’S HOUSE AND A LOST ERA
POSTED BY HENRY ALLEN

In the early nineteen-fifties, my grandfather sold the family house in Orange, New Jersey. It was the sensible thing to do. My grandmother was long dead, their three sons were gone. It was an old ark of a place, as my mother would say. Its time was over. Nevertheless, even as the country around us levitated into television modernity and Cold War paranoia, the house would linger as a sense of foreclosed possibility, of diaspora. It was like a planet that disappears, leaving behind only its gravity.

Not that losing it was a tragedy; more a case of the old truth that we have to change or pay more to stay the same. Still, there was something heroic about life there, heroically modest in the vanishing style that sought the respect of friends but not the envy of rivals.

We called it 407 after its address, 407 Highland Avenue—an early Victorian, a big house on a street of big houses. It had high ceilings, airy and claustrophobic at the same time, like a church. It had a cured smell, the comfortable pungence of a can of pipe tobacco or mink coats in closets. There were huge Oriental rugs, wingback chairs, and standup ashtrays. On tables were objects of crystal, bronze, and sterling silver with monograms—cigarette boxes, porringers, picture frames, and a tea set of architectural splendor. To me, at the age of ten or so, it all had the air of furnishings for a ritual, however outworn.

Henry Southworth Allen Jr.-290.jpg

My grandfather, Henry Southworth Allen, Jr., was called Harry. (My father is the third with that name, and I am the fourth.) He was a managing partner at Spencer Trask, a Wall Street investment bank. It was a station in life that gave him much satisfaction. He bought 407 after the First World War. An artist had owned it once, and had added a studio that went up two stories, enclosing an exterior wall whose bedroom windows overlooked what became the living room. After bedtime, we children could peer down on the mysteries of grownups, the men backhanding logs into the fireplace and lighting the women’s cigarettes.

When the three Allen sons, my father and his two younger brothers, got together there on holidays, they had wary smiles, as if life at 407 were an inside joke. They had grace, too, gliding around in pleated trousers that hung from high nineteen-forties waists. They lightly hitched them up by the creases before they sat down; they held cigarettes at the last knuckle of their fingers and smoked only half of them. They had spent their youths on the right lists, for coming-out parties at the Ritz-Carlton or the Plaza. That was before the war.

By my time, the old Anglo-Saxon stock was losing sway. Its presumptuousness was coming to look absurd, but lost at the same time was the grace that had given way to the raw energy of post-war America. Still, my father retained the best and easiest manners of any man I have known. They accompanied his belief that “everything comes back.”

The Allen sons’ wives wore wide-shouldered dresses with narrow waists and they braced their elbows against their ribs to hold cigarettes up, devil-may-care, like torches. They seemed resigned—they’d been married long enough to suspect that the Allen boys would disappoint them, sons of a father who’d raised them to have the off-handed demeanor of the rich whom he admired. It was the money that was the problem.

There had been money at 407, but, in 1931, one of my grandfather’s partners made a catastrophic deal on Canadian timber and soon my grandmother, Mildred, made a legendary vow: “The next time we’ve got money like that, we’re going to spend a little of it.” In photographs she has a bold, open face. I have one of her at the tiller of an electric car—she was said to have been the second licensed woman driver in Massachusetts. She came from New Bedford. Much of her family’s money, made in textiles, had been lost when “the mills went South,” as my father would mournfully intone.

Mildred Bowen Allen-580.jpg

As a young woman, my mother had played cards with her in the front room. She thought the meander of veins on the backs of Mil’s hands was beautiful. Along with the grand piano, which had chipped keys and a heavy action, there was a radio. On Saturday afternoons in the thirties, my father and his mother used to listen to the Metropolitan Opera together. The Christmas tree went next to the piano. In my time, I had the feeling it had been decorated by the maids, Rose and Pauline, and nobody else looked at it.

Rose and Pauline had also taken on the job of preparing meals after the Depression foreclosed on certain possibilities: Packards, a water-view summer house in Southport, a cook. Their kitchen had an industrial feeling—only servants used it, after all. I remember a smell of hominy. An old cookie jar stood on a counter but there were never any cookies in it. There was a back staircase I liked, an invitation to rainy-day playfulness in a house that seemed to constrain that sort of thing. There was a big hole in the pantry door.

“Rats,” my father explained. I wonder now why it hadn’t been patched.

When Fanny came to do the laundry there was a thick sharp smell of soap and steam. All three women were black. Fanny had put her son through medical school; he then lost his medical license for performing abortions. “It broke her heart,” my father said. He cared most for people as individuals rather than social abstractions, though he voted for Roosevelt and the New Deal, perhaps in secret. His own father called him “Ruse-evelt” in the manner of Republicans who hated him.

The Allens of 407 were still rich by most reckonings, but they knew the vast distance between the rich and the very rich, the ones who, as F. Scott Fitzgerald wrote, are different from you and me. One asset held firm: the proprietary air that lurks in families who arrived in New England in the first decades of the sixteen-hundreds. We were children of the Old Ones, the God-bitten Indian killers of New England whose descendants would have Presidents to dinner, and whose ghosts still haunted multi-poly-diversity America. This heritage was seldom mentioned, and then only with a tone of voice meant to dismiss it as irrelevant. Anything more would have seemed undemocratic.

Allen-at-boarding-school.jpg

My father was born in 1910. He grew up in a world of knickers, coal furnaces, servants, trolley cars, neckties worn on golf courses, and the Jazz Age of Fitzgerald, whom he disdained for flamboyance unbecoming of a fellow Princeton man. In photographs he has the presumptuous earnestness of a boarding-school boy he’d been (St. George’s, 1928) and a slight hardness to his stare—the sort of look that military officers cultivate. He was proud of his boyhood, and he wanted me to have a boyhood like it, busy with hobbies, experiments, and collections. I disappointed him.

He played the piano in the front room. He could play Chopin’s easier pieces, but his first love was musical comedy. He bought sheet music and learned the American songbook as it was being written. He taught himself to draw. He collected stamps that his father brought home from his office at Spencer Trask; stamps from now-vanished countries—Abyssinia, the Dutch East Indies. He listened to a crystal-set radio. He read St. Nicholas magazine for children, with its stories by authors with three names such as Albert Payson Terhune, who wrote about dogs.

Dad had a dog, a Boston bull terrier named Bobby. When I was a boy, after the Second World War, he took me into the back yard of 407 and showed me where he had buried Bobby.

“I put his collar on the fence post,” he said, his face going simple with grief.

“What happened to the collar?” I asked.

He startled me by snapping: “That rotted away years ago.”

I was born in 1941; my grandmother died soon after, of asthma and heart disease, at the age of fifty-six. She and her death seemed to occupy 407, at the edge of our peripheral vision. My grandfather took refuge in a small, dark, ground-floor bedroom. He would lead me and my younger sister, Julie, in there, lift us up, and let us put one hand in his penny jar. We could keep all the pennies we could hold—a lesson in the fundamentals of capitalism.

He had a little potbelly, quick eyes, and a busy precision about him. In middle age he had learned to figure skate in the old style, gliding backward to draw figure eights. He believed in homeopathy. He was superstitious. If he saw a man on crutches during his morning ferry ride to Wall Street and then the market went down, he’d come home grumbling about the “goddam cripple.” After very bad days, he would throw away the necktie he’d worn.

Into the nineteen-forties, he still went to New York on Saturdays to work a half day in the old style. He would not return until evening. My father asked him once what he did with the other half of the day.

He said: “I have lunch with Kerensky and then we go antique shopping.”

Kerensky! Alexander Kerensky, who lived in New York then, had been the Prime Minister of Russia, the last chance for democracy before the Bolsheviks overthrew him. I love the bravado of this lie. The truth was, my grandfather spent Saturdays with his secretary and their son: he had another family.

I wrote a poem about this:

Grandpa had a mistress.
The mistress had a son.
When Grandpa died the cancelled checks
Would show what he had done.
My grandfather was everything to my father. My mother despised him. “He was such a phony,” she would say.

She resented him for allowing one and only one martini to be served before dinner. He kept a close eye on the drinking, a family disease. I suspect she also didn’t like having to fight him for my father’s loyalty. He insisted that my father—though not his younger brother, David—follow him to Wall Street, as if it were a family legacy. My grandmother thought that he should be an Episcopal priest, but she was overruled. I think he would have found the clergy tedious, but he found working as a bond broker tedious, too—and he lacked the knack for making money. As for my father’s own youthful ambitions, he mooned over two impossible romances: Broadway songwriting and going to sea, as he had read about it in Joseph Conrad.

Through family connections, Dad worked as a merchant sailor during summers at Princeton, sailing to Brazil and China. At Princeton he tried out for the Triangle Club, whose celebrated musical show used to tour from city to city every year. My father’s year, Jimmy Stewart made it, but Dad and his songs were turned down. I think he was crushed. He kept writing songs, though. He thought his best was one called “Winter Coming On.”

So here am I
With nothing to do but sigh
in the long night, the lonely night
of winter coming on.
Near the end of his junior year, he quit Princeton to attempt a transatlantic sail in a thirty-six-foot Friendship sloop with two friends—a feat that was covered in at least one New York newspaper. The boat sprung a board five hundred miles out, and they had to pump their way back to Nova Scotia. While repairs were being made, my father got a job harpooning swordfish. He hated the cruelty of it.

He told me about his boyhood failures, perhaps to comfort me for mine. Once, at St. George’s, he was running down a football field with the winning pass arcing toward him, and dropped the ball. I was sorry he told me.

In Southport, before the Depression, my father crewed on a Star boat that tied for first in the Eastern championships. The skipper had already rented a flatcar to haul the boat to San Francisco for the Nationals. In the sail-off, the other Star went out looking for wind on a reach and found it, and that was that. So many almosts, so many not quites.

My grandfather’s proprieties wore down my grandmother. She also had to deal with Harry’s mother and his unmarried sister, Florrie, who also lived at 407 and took his side.

Mil got her revenge, though, when her youngest son, Peter, was born, in 1922. She “spoiled him rotten,” my mother would say with satisfaction. He was a wild child who saw the family’s decorum as a joke, not an obligation. At the age of three, the legend had it, he ran crying into the house: “Goddam bee stung me.”

He would go on to a series of school expulsions and car wrecks, gambling debts, a teen-age elopement, and lost jobs. He was also a war hero decorated for risking his life to put out a fire in his B-24 over Europe. He was the smartest son and the funniest. I named my first son after him.

I knew from family stories that there had been much fun at 407. At the dinner table on festive occasions, they would put napkins on their heads and say to each other in turn, “This is a very serious occasion,” until they were laughing too hard to continue. On holidays, the best part of dinner for me was the desserts that Rose and Pauline made with brandy—pies and hard sauce. The alcohol fumes were supposed to catch fire but, despite the lighting of many matches, flames were fugitive.

Rose and Pauline stayed on until 407 was sold. By that time, there was a new suburban way of life that excluded servants and the schedules that went with them. On Sundays, they had gone to early church, and then cooked Sunday dinner for the family to eat when they returned from the eleven o’clock service. In our little postwar house, one county over from 407, my mother cooked Sunday dinner while my sister and I had to wait in our church clothes, knowing our friends were outside playing.

Grandpa visited us but he looked uncomfortable in our house and complained of drafts.

In 1938, my father was on the floor of the Stock Exchange when the bell rang to stop trading, a rare and drastic event. There was an announcement. Richard Whitney, former president of the Exchange, treasurer of the New York Yacht Club, master of the Far Hills Hunt, and the model of everything admired at 407 had been arrested. The crime was the sleaziest of betrayals on Wall Street then: embezzlement from funds he oversaw.

“Richard Whitney!” my father said to me. “Richard Whitney! Impossible!” It was reported that people crowded in Grand Central Station to see him taken off to prison in handcuffs.

After commanding a landing ship through the carnage at Okinawa, and satisfying any craving he still had for the sea, my father defied my grandfather and quit Wall Street to sell wholesale silverware. He liked selling. He was good at it, though later he was not as good when he moved into management. Grandpa insisted that he describe himself not as a salesman but as a “district sales manager.” Along with his boyhood, the Navy was my father’s greatest success. Meanwhile, my uncles lived as if they were in exile, moving through futureless jobs in out-of-the-way cities. David ran an Eastern Airlines ticket office in Atlantic City, I remember, and Peter moved from rental to rental, one step ahead of the landlord.

Whiskey, the sovereign remedy for the pain of change, became a way of living that was also a way of dying. Drinking is a borrowing against a future that never comes. Instead, there are business disappointments, debts, and marrying down—a regression to the mean.

Its hat factories long gone, Orange was turning shabby. Before the tracks were torn up, my grandfather took me for a ride so I’d know what a trolley had been. Family legend had it that a distant cousin had travelled from New Jersey to Rhode Island on the interurban trolley that once linked towns on the East Coast.

With stunning crassness or encroaching dementia, my grandfather remarried in his late sixties in a grand church wedding with flower girls, the flinging of rose petals, and a celebrity minister—Norman Vincent Peale, the author of “The Power of Positive Thinking.” The new wife, named Molly, turned out to be a middle-aged drunk and a hanger-on of ministers who bilked her and us. My mother said that she gave 407’s Oriental rugs—and who knows what else—to someone she called “the Revender Cooper.”

In a last chance for 407, my grandfather offered to sell it to my father, but he or my mother or both of them said no. I liked the idea—my last chance at equalling my father’s boyhood—but I recall them saying that it would cost a fortune to heat.

Grandpa and Molly moved to a stuffy apartment in a building that my father called “Menopause Hall.” Grandpa died there during a nap, after church, on Easter Sunday. My sister and I were not allowed to go to the funeral. I don’t know why. I wonder now if the mistress was there with her son, our half-uncle.

The widow pestered my father with drunken late-night phone calls. She stepped in a paint pot and fell downstairs. We heard that she’d gone into a nursing home and then we lost track of her. I think my father felt she was the living corruption of everything that 407 and his mother had stood for. In a burst of cynicism, he said that his father had married her because he thought she had money.

Now I am the oldest member of the family. I have lived my life in the exile of bohemia and journalism. After claiming some casualties, the family disease is finally in remission—I haven’t had a drink for more than twenty years. There are great-grandchildren and great-great-grandchildren with newfound energy and delight in life—from a law partner, a school principal, and a ski champion to a four-year-old in a tutu on Halloween. This chronicle may mean little to them; history stops at your grandparents. And when my sister and I die, along with a few cousins, there will be no one to remember our 407, no one to honor its tutelary deities, which is to say that there will be no 407 at all by our lights, just an old house in an exhausted city in New Jersey.

Henry Allen wrote and edited for thirty-nine years at the Washington Post. He won the Pulitzer Prize for criticism, in 2000.

Images, from top: The author’s grandmother Mildred Bowen Allen, with her sons, in a sailboat. The author’s grandfather Henry Southworth Allen, Jr., who was called Harry. A drawing by the author, done from a photograph of his father at St. George’s. The author’s grandmother in a car with her dog Fluffy Ruffles.

KEYWORDS TRAVEL

Assessing the Value of a College Degree

THE SATURDAY ESSAY
Degrees of Value: Making College Pay Off
For Too Many Americans, College Today Isn’t Worth It

By GLENN HARLAN REYNOLDS
Updated Jan. 3, 2014 8:40 p.m. ET

In the field of higher education, reality is outrunning parody. A recent feature on the satire website the Onion proclaimed, “30-Year-Old Has Earned $11 More Than He Would Have Without College Education.” Allowing for tuition, interest on student loans, and four years of foregone income while in school, the fictional student “Patrick Moorhouse” wasn’t much better off. His years of stress and study, the article japed, “have been more or less a financial wash.”

“Patrick” shouldn’t feel too bad. Many college graduates would be happy to be $11 ahead instead of thousands, or hundreds of thousands, behind. The credit-driven higher education bubble of the past several decades has left legions of students deep in debt without improving their job prospects. To make college a good value again, today’s parents and students need to be skeptical, frugal and demanding. There is no single solution to what ails higher education in the U.S., but changes are beginning to emerge, from outsourcing to online education, and they could transform the system.

Though the GI Bill converted college from a privilege of the rich to a middle-class expectation, the higher education bubble really began in the 1970s, as colleges that had expanded to serve the baby boom saw the tide of students threatening to ebb. Congress came to the rescue with federally funded student aid, like Pell Grants and, in vastly greater dollar amounts, student loans.

Predictably enough, this financial assistance led colleges and universities to raise tuition and fees to absorb the resources now available to their students. As University of Michigan economics and finance professor Mark Perry has calculated, tuition for all universities, public and private, increased from 1978 to 2011 at an annual rate of 7.45%. By comparison, health-care costs increased by only 5.8%, and housing, notwithstanding the bubble, increased at 4.3%. Family incomes, on the other hand, barely kept up with the consumer-price index, which grew at an annual rate of 3.8%.

For many families, the gap between soaring tuition costs and stagnant incomes was filled by debt. Today’s average student debt of $29,400 may not sound overwhelming, but many students, especially at private and out-of-state colleges, end up owing much more, often more than $100,000. At the same time, four in 10 college graduates, according to a recent Gallup study, wind up in jobs that don’t require a college degree.

Students and parents have started to reject this unsustainable arrangement, and colleges and universities have felt the impact. According to a recent analysis by this newspaper, private schools are facing a long-term decline in enrollment. More than a quarter of private institutions have suffered a drop of 10% or more—in some cases, much more. Midway College in Kentucky is laying off around a dozen of its 54 faculty members; Wittenberg University in Ohio is eliminating nearly 30 of about 140 full-time faculty slots; and Pine Manor College in Massachusetts, with dorm space for 600 students but only 300 enrolled, has gone coed in hopes of bringing in more warm bodies.

Even elite institutions haven’t been spared, as schools such as Haverford, Morehouse, Oberlin and Wellesley have seen their credit ratings downgraded by Moody’s over doubts about the viability of their high tuition/high overhead business models. Law schools, including Albany Law School, Brooklyn Law School and Thomas Jefferson Law School, have also seen credit downgrades over similar doubts. And now Democrats on Capitol Hill are pushing legislation to give colleges “skin in the game” by clawing back federal aid money from schools with high student-loan default rates. Expect such proposals to get traction in 2014.

America’s higher education problem calls for both wiser choices by families and better value from schools. For some students, this will mean choosing a major carefully (opting for a more practical area of study, like engineering over the humanities), going to a less expensive community college or skipping college altogether to learn a trade.

For their part, schools must adjust to the new economic reality, as some already have. In 2011, the University of the South in Sewanee, Tenn., cut tuition by 10%. The discount not only increased enrollment but, ultimately, brought in more money. For academic year 2014-15, Ashland University in Ohio has cut its tuition by 37%—more than $10,000. Faced with plummeting applications, the law schools at George Mason, Penn State, Seton Hall and the University of Iowa have rolled back or frozen their tuition fees.

Many colleges, according to a survey released last spring by the National Association of College and University Business Officers, are also offering hidden discounts in the form of increased financial aid. The survey found that for the fall of 2013, the average “tuition discount rate” for incoming freshmen (that is, the reduction of the list price through grants and scholarships) hit an all-time high of 45%. Such variable pricing is likely to become more widely publicized in the future as competition for students increases and as parents paying full tuition object to being taken advantage of.

But discounts don’t address the real problem: high costs. What’s really needed in U.S. higher education is major structural change. To remain viable, colleges and universities need to cut expenditures dramatically. For decades, they have ridden the student-loan gravy train, using the proceeds to build palatial buildings, reduce faculty teaching loads and, most notably, hire armies of administrators.

Most of the growth in higher education costs, according to a 2010 study by the Goldwater Institute, a libertarian think tank, comes from administrative bloat, with administrative staff growing at more than twice the rate of instructional staff. At the University of Michigan, for example, there are 53% more administrators than faculty, and similar ratios can be found at other institutions.

Under financial pressure, many schools have already farmed out the teaching of classes to low-paid adjuncts who have no job security and often no benefits.

This approach could be extended to administration, replacing salaried employees with low-paid “adjunct administrators” to handle routine functions. Many in the corporate world have reaped considerable savings by outsourcing back-office functions, and there is no reason this approach can’t work in higher education. (If U.S. News & World Report wants to improve its widely cited college rankings, it might start by giving schools credit for leaner administration.)

Another reform that would be useful at both public and private institutions is budget transparency. University finances are notoriously Byzantine, and administrators generally like it that way. But change is afoot here too.

Several years ago, the state of Oregon launched a website, updated daily, that shows where every state dollar is spent. The result: Anyone can see how much Oregon’s higher-education system is spending on things like travel, instruction and athletics. This is the sort of transparency that taxpayers should demand from public universities—and perhaps even from private universities that receive significant amounts of public money, as nearly all do.

New instructional methods can also contribute to cost savings. Online courses are already making inroads, and the model makes intuitive sense for many subjects: Take the top teachers in a field and give online access to their lectures to students at many different colleges. There isn’t a lot of one-on-one interaction in such courses, but how much genuine interaction is there in a live 200-student lecture class?

Once students have acquired basic instruction in larger, less personal classes, they can apply it in smaller advanced classes, where they would deal with faculty face to face. This approach is already used to great effect by the popular Khan Academy, a sophisticated not-for-profit website where primary and secondary students view lectures at their convenience and perfect their skills through video-game-like software. Students can then use classroom time to work through problems with teachers and apply what they have learned. The idea is to take advantage of mass delivery where it works best and to allow individualized attention where it helps most.

Traditional universities are experimenting too. The Georgia Institute of Technology is offering an entirely online master’s degree in computer science for $7,000. This isn’t a ghettoized offering from the extension school but rather, in the words of Georgia Tech Provost Rafael Bras, “a full-service degree.” The Massachusetts Institute of Technology has already put many of its courses online; you can learn from them and even get certification, but there is no degree attached. If MIT were to add standard exams and a diploma, its online degree might be worth a lot—perhaps not as much as an old-fashioned MIT degree but more than a degree from many existing bricks-and-mortar schools.

Another alternative, already beginning to get some traction, lies in the rise of various certification systems. A college degree is often used by employers as an indication that its holder has a reasonable ability to read, write, show up on time and deal with others. But many employers are unhappy with the skills that today’s graduates possess.

This has led to the rise of certification schemes from within the higher education world, including the Educational Testing Service’s Revised Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA+) and ACT’s WorkKeys, which is explicitly aimed at employment skills. Manufacturing companies are working with online schools and community colleges to create “stackable certificates” that vouch for specific competencies. Such programs may someday bypass higher education entirely, testing and certifying people’s skills regardless of how they obtained them.

But what about the “college experience”—late-night dorm bull sessions, partying and pizza? Won’t it be ruined by these new approaches to instruction? Not necessarily.

We may eventually see the rise of “hoteling” for college students whose courses are done primarily online. Build a nice campus—or buy one, from a defunct traditional school—put in a lot of amenities, but don’t bother hiring faculty: Just bring in your courses online, with engineering from Georgia Tech, arts and literature from Yale, business from Stanford and so on. Hire some unemployed Ph.D.s as tutors (there will be plenty around, available at bargain-basement rates) and offer an unbundled experience. It’s a business model that just might work, especially in geographic locations students favor. Grand Cayman is awfully nice this time of year.

On the other hand, for some students, avoiding the traditional campus-based college scene might be a boon in the long run. Recent research by the sociologists Elizabeth Armstrong of the University of Michigan and Laura Hamilton of the University of California, Merced, points to the problem of what they call the “party pathway.” In a study they conducted among 48 female students in one residence hall at Indiana University from 2004 to 2009, they found that young women who were similar in terms of “predictors” (grades and test scores) nonetheless emerged from college on very different career trajectories. Those from more modest circumstances were often done in by their partying-related stumbles and actually experienced downward mobility after graduating.

None of these alternatives to a traditional university degree is “the answer” to the higher education bubble. And we certainly shouldn’t discard entirely the old-fashioned approach to college, whatever its shortcomings. A rigorous liberal arts education, with an emphasis on reading carefully and writing clearly, remains a tremendous asset, for employment as for citizenship. (The key word here, however, is “rigorous.”)

But there is no point in trying to preserve the old regime. Today’s emphasis on measuring college education in terms of future earnings and employability may strike some as philistine, but most students have little choice. When you could pay your way through college by waiting tables, the idea that you should “study what interests you” was more viable than it is today, when the cost of a four-year degree often runs to six figures. For an 18-year-old, investing such a sum in an education without a payoff makes no more sense than buying a Ferrari on credit.

The economist Herbert Stein once said that if something can’t go on forever, it will stop. The pattern of the last few decades, in which higher education costs grew much faster than incomes, with the difference made up by borrowing, can’t go on forever. As students and parents begin to apply the brakes, colleges need to find ways to make that stop a smooth one rather than a crash.

Mr. Reynolds is a law professor at the University of Tennessee in Knoxville. This essay is adapted from his new book, “The New School: How the Information Age Will Save American Education From Itself,” published by Encounter Books.

American Dream in Peril?

“The Crisis of the Middle Class and American Power is republished with the permission of Stratfor”

By George Friedman
When I wrote about the crisis of unemployment in Europe, I received a great deal of feedback. Europeans agreed that this is the core problem while Americans argued that the United States has the same problem, asserting that U.S. unemployment is twice as high as the government’s official unemployment rate. My counterargument is that unemployment in the United States is not a problem in the same sense that it is in Europe because it does not pose a geopolitical threat. The United States does not face political disintegration from unemployment, whatever the number is. Europe might.
At the same time, I would agree that the United States faces a potentially significant but longer-term geopolitical problem deriving from economic trends. The threat to the United States is the persistent decline in the middle class’ standard of living, a problem that is reshaping the social order that has been in place since World War II and that, if it continues, poses a threat to American power.
The Crisis of the American Middle Class

The median household income of Americans in 2011 was $49,103. Adjusted for inflation, the median income is just below what it was in 1989 and is $4,000 less than it was in 2000. Take-home income is a bit less than $40,000 when Social Security and state and federal taxes are included. That means a monthly income, per household, of about $3,300. It is urgent to bear in mind that half of all American households earn less than this. It is also vital to consider not the difference between 1990 and 2011, but the difference between the 1950s and 1960s and the 21st century. This is where the difference in the meaning of middle class becomes most apparent.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the median income allowed you to live with a single earner — normally the husband, with the wife typically working as homemaker — and roughly three children. It permitted the purchase of modest tract housing, one late model car and an older one. It allowed a driving vacation somewhere and, with care, some savings as well. I know this because my family was lower-middle class, and this is how we lived, and I know many others in my generation who had the same background. It was not an easy life and many luxuries were denied us, but it wasn’t a bad life at all.
Someone earning the median income today might just pull this off, but it wouldn’t be easy. Assuming that he did not have college loans to pay off but did have two car loans to pay totaling $700 a month, and that he could buy food, clothing and cover his utilities for $1,200 a month, he would have $1,400 a month for mortgage, real estate taxes and insurance, plus some funds for fixing the air conditioner and dishwasher. At a 5 percent mortgage rate, that would allow him to buy a house in the $200,000 range. He would get a refund back on his taxes from deductions but that would go to pay credit card bills he had from Christmas presents and emergencies. It could be done, but not easily and with great difficulty in major metropolitan areas. And if his employer didn’t cover health insurance, that $4,000-5,000 for three or four people would severely limit his expenses. And of course, he would have to have $20,000-40,000 for a down payment and closing costs on his home. There would be little else left over for a week at the seashore with the kids.
And this is for the median. Those below him — half of all households — would be shut out of what is considered middle-class life, with the house, the car and the other associated amenities. Those amenities shift upward on the scale for people with at least $70,000 in income. The basics might be available at the median level, given favorable individual circumstance, but below that life becomes surprisingly meager, even in the range of the middle class and certainly what used to be called the lower-middle class.
The Expectation of Upward Mobility

I should pause and mention that this was one of the fundamental causes of the 2007-2008 subprime lending crisis. People below the median took out loans with deferred interest with the expectation that their incomes would continue the rise that was traditional since World War II. The caricature of the borrower as irresponsible misses the point. The expectation of rising real incomes was built into the American culture, and many assumed based on that that the rise would resume in five years. When it didn’t they were trapped, but given history, they were not making an irresponsible assumption.
American history was always filled with the assumption that upward mobility was possible. The Midwest and West opened land that could be exploited, and the massive industrialization in the late 19th and early 20th centuries opened opportunities. There was a systemic expectation of upward mobility built into American culture and reality.
The Great Depression was a shock to the system, and it wasn’t solved by the New Deal, nor even by World War II alone. The next drive for upward mobility came from post-war programs for veterans, of whom there were more than 10 million. These programs were instrumental in creating post-industrial America, by creating a class of suburban professionals. There were three programs that were critical:
The GI Bill, which allowed veterans to go to college after the war, becoming professionals frequently several notches above their parents.
The part of the GI Bill that provided federally guaranteed mortgages to veterans, allowing low and no down payment mortgages and low interest rates to graduates of publicly funded universities.
The federally funded Interstate Highway System, which made access to land close to but outside of cities easier, enabling both the dispersal of populations on inexpensive land (which made single-family houses possible) and, later, the dispersal of business to the suburbs.
There were undoubtedly many other things that contributed to this, but these three not only reshaped America but also created a new dimension to the upward mobility that was built into American life from the beginning. Moreover, these programs were all directed toward veterans, to whom it was acknowledged a debt was due, or were created for military reasons (the Interstate Highway System was funded to enable the rapid movement of troops from coast to coast, which during World War II was found to be impossible). As a result, there was consensus around the moral propriety of the programs.
The subprime fiasco was rooted in the failure to understand that the foundations of middle class life were not under temporary pressure but something more fundamental. Where a single earner could support a middle class family in the generation after World War II, it now took at least two earners. That meant that the rise of the double-income family corresponded with the decline of the middle class. The lower you go on the income scale, the more likely you are to be a single mother. That shift away from social pressure for two parent homes was certainly part of the problem.
Re-engineering the Corporation

But there was, I think, the crisis of the modern corporation. Corporations provided long-term employment to the middle class. It was not unusual to spend your entire life working for one. Working for a corporation, you received yearly pay increases, either as a union or non-union worker. The middle class had both job security and rising income, along with retirement and other benefits. Over the course of time, the culture of the corporation diverged from the realities, as corporate productivity lagged behind costs and the corporations became more and more dysfunctional and ultimately unsupportable. In addition, the corporations ceased focusing on doing one thing well and instead became conglomerates, with a management frequently unable to keep up with the complexity of multiple lines of business.
For these and many other reasons, the corporation became increasingly inefficient, and in the terms of the 1980s, they had to be re-engineered — which meant taken apart, pared down, refined and refocused. And the re-engineering of the corporation, designed to make them agile, meant that there was a permanent revolution in business. Everything was being reinvented. Huge amounts of money, managed by people whose specialty was re-engineering companies, were deployed. The choice was between total failure and radical change. From the point of view of the individual worker, this frequently meant the same thing: unemployment. From the view of the economy, it meant the creation of value whether through breaking up companies, closing some of them or sending jobs overseas. It was designed to increase the total efficiency, and it worked for the most part.
This is where the disjuncture occurred. From the point of view of the investor, they had saved the corporation from total meltdown by redesigning it. From the point of view of the workers, some retained the jobs that they would have lost, while others lost the jobs they would have lost anyway. But the important thing is not the subjective bitterness of those who lost their jobs, but something more complex.
As the permanent corporate jobs declined, more people were starting over. Some of them were starting over every few years as the agile corporation grew more efficient and needed fewer employees. That meant that if they got new jobs it would not be at the munificent corporate pay rate but at near entry-level rates in the small companies that were now the growth engine. As these companies failed, were bought or shifted direction, they would lose their jobs and start over again. Wages didn’t rise for them and for long periods they might be unemployed, never to get a job again in their now obsolete fields, and certainly not working at a company for the next 20 years.
The restructuring of inefficient companies did create substantial value, but that value did not flow to the now laid-off workers. Some might flow to the remaining workers, but much of it went to the engineers who restructured the companies and the investors they represented. Statistics reveal that, since 1947 (when the data was first compiled), corporate profits as a percentage of gross domestic product are now at their highest level, while wages as a percentage of GDP are now at their lowest level. It was not a question of making the economy more efficient — it did do that — it was a question of where the value accumulated. The upper segment of the wage curve and the investors continued to make money. The middle class divided into a segment that entered the upper-middle class, while another faction sank into the lower-middle class.
American society on the whole was never egalitarian. It always accepted that there would be substantial differences in wages and wealth. Indeed, progress was in some ways driven by a desire to emulate the wealthy. There was also the expectation that while others received far more, the entire wealth structure would rise in tandem. It was also understood that, because of skill or luck, others would lose.
What we are facing now is a structural shift, in which the middle class’ center, not because of laziness or stupidity, is shifting downward in terms of standard of living. It is a structural shift that is rooted in social change (the breakdown of the conventional family) and economic change (the decline of traditional corporations and the creation of corporate agility that places individual workers at a massive disadvantage).
The inherent crisis rests in an increasingly efficient economy and a population that can’t consume what is produced because it can’t afford the products. This has happened numerous times in history, but the United States, excepting the Great Depression, was the counterexample.
Obviously, this is a massive political debate, save that political debates identify problems without clarifying them. In political debates, someone must be blamed. In reality, these processes are beyond even the government’s ability to control. On one hand, the traditional corporation was beneficial to the workers until it collapsed under the burden of its costs. On the other hand, the efficiencies created threaten to undermine consumption by weakening the effective demand among half of society.
The Long-Term Threat

The greatest danger is one that will not be faced for decades but that is lurking out there. The United States was built on the assumption that a rising tide lifts all ships. That has not been the case for the past generation, and there is no indication that this socio-economic reality will change any time soon. That means that a core assumption is at risk. The problem is that social stability has been built around this assumption — not on the assumption that everyone is owed a living, but the assumption that on the whole, all benefit from growing productivity and efficiency.
If we move to a system where half of the country is either stagnant or losing ground while the other half is surging, the social fabric of the United States is at risk, and with it the massive global power the United States has accumulated. Other superpowers such as Britain or Rome did not have the idea of a perpetually improving condition of the middle class as a core value. The United States does. If it loses that, it loses one of the pillars of its geopolitical power.
The left would argue that the solution is for laws to transfer wealth from the rich to the middle class. That would increase consumption but, depending on the scope, would threaten the amount of capital available to investment by the transfer itself and by eliminating incentives to invest. You can’t invest what you don’t have, and you won’t accept the risk of investment if the payoff is transferred away from you.
The agility of the American corporation is critical. The right will argue that allowing the free market to function will fix the problem. The free market doesn’t guarantee social outcomes, merely economic ones. In other words, it may give more efficiency on the whole and grow the economy as a whole, but by itself it doesn’t guarantee how wealth is distributed. The left cannot be indifferent to the historical consequences of extreme redistribution of wealth. The right cannot be indifferent to the political consequences of a middle-class life undermined, nor can it be indifferent to half the population’s inability to buy the products and services that businesses sell.
The most significant actions made by governments tend to be unintentional. The GI Bill was designed to limit unemployment among returning serviceman; it inadvertently created a professional class of college graduates. The VA loan was designed to stimulate the construction industry; it created the basis for suburban home ownership. The Interstate Highway System was meant to move troops rapidly in the event of war; it created a new pattern of land use that was suburbia.
It is unclear how the private sector can deal with the problem of pressure on the middle class. Government programs frequently fail to fulfill even minimal intentions while squandering scarce resources. The United States has been a fortunate country, with solutions frequently emerging in unexpected ways.
It would seem to me that unless the United States gets lucky again, its global dominance is in jeopardy. Considering its history, the United States can expect to get lucky again, but it usually gets lucky when it is frightened. And at this point it isn’t frightened but angry, believing that if only its own solutions were employed, this problem and all others would go away. I am arguing that the conventional solutions offered by all sides do not yet grasp the magnitude of the problem — that the foundation of American society is at risk — and therefore all sides are content to repeat what has been said before.
People who are smarter and luckier than I am will have to craft the solution. I am simply pointing out the potential consequences of the problem and the inadequacy of all the ideas I have seen so far.
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Thoughts on the Nature of Good and Evil

6 Surprising Scientific Findings About Good and Evil

Harvard’s Joshua Greene on the evolution of morality—and why humanity may, objectively, be getting better in the long run.
—By Chris Mooney | Fri Dec. 13, 2013 3:00 AM GMT

The trolley dilemma
Maybe you already know the famous hypothetical dilemma: A train is barreling down a track, about to hit five people, who are certain to die if nothing happens. You are standing at a fork in the track and can throw a switch to divert the train to another track—but if you do so, one person, tied to that other track, will die. So what would you do? And moreover, what do you think your fellow citizens would do?

The first question is a purely ethical one; the second, however, can be investigated scientifically. And in the past decade, a group of researchers have been pursuing precisely that sort of investigation. They’ve put our sense of right and wrong in lab, and even in the fMRI machine. And their findings have begun to dramatically illuminate how we make moral and political decisions and, perhaps, will even reshape our understanding of what morality is in the first place.

“The core of morality is a suite of psychological capacities that enable us to get along in groups,” explains Harvard’s Joshua Greene, a leader in this research and author of the new book Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them, on the latest episode of the Inquiring Minds podcast (listen above). The word “group” here is essential: According to Greene, while we have innate dispositions to care for one another, they’re ultimately limited and work best among smallish clans of people who trust and know each other.

Joshua Greene Andrea Heberlein
The morality that the globalizing world of today requires, Greene argues, is thus quite different from the morality that comes naturally to us. To see how he reaches this conclusion, let’s go through some surprising facts from Greene’s research and from the science of morality generally:

1. Evolution gave us morality—as a default setting. One central finding of modern morality research is that humans, like other social animals, naturally feel emotions, such as empathy and gratitude, that are crucial to group functioning. These feelings make it easy for us to be good; indeed, they’re so basic that, according to Greene’s research, cooperation seems to come naturally and automatically.

Greene and his colleagues have shown as much through experiments in which people play something called the “Public Goods Game.” A group of participants are each given equal amounts of tokens or money (say $5 each). They are then invited to place some of their money a shared pool, whose amount is increased each round (let’s say doubled) and then redistributed evenly among players. So if there are four players and everybody is fully cooperative, $20 goes into the pool and $40 comes out, and everybody doubles their money, taking away $10. However, participants can also hold on to their money and act as a “free rider,” taking earnings out of the group pot even though they put nothing in.

In one Public Goods Game experiment, Greene and his colleagues decided to speed the process up. They made people play the game faster, decide what to do quicker. And the result was more “moral” behavior and less free-riding, suggesting that cooperation is a default. “We have gut reactions that make us cooperative,” Greene says. Indeed, he adds, “If you force people to stop and think, then they’re less likely to be cooperative.”

2. Gossip is our moral scorecard. In the Public Goods Game, free riders don’t just make more money than cooperators. They can tank the whole game, because everybody becomes less cooperative as they watch free riders profit at their expense. In some game versions, however, a technique called “pro-social punishment” is allowed. You can pay a small amount of your own money to make sure that a free rider loses money for not cooperating. When this happens, cooperation picks up again—because now it is being enforced.

Penguin
Real life isn’t a Public Goods Game, but it is in many ways analogous. We also keep tabs and enforce norms through punishment; in Moral Tribes, Greene suggests that a primary way that we do so is through gossip. He cites the anthropologist Robin Dunbar, who found that two-thirds of human conversations involve chattering about other people, including spreading word of who’s behaving well and who’s behaving badly. Thus do we impose serious costs on those who commit anti-social behavior.

3. We’re built to solve the problem of “me versus us.” We don’t know how to deal with “us versus them.” Cooperation, enforcing beneficial social norms: These are some of the relatively positive aspects of our basic morality. But the research also shows something much less rosy. For just as we’re naturally inclined to be cooperative within our own group, we’re also inclined to distrust other groups (or worse). “In-group favoritism and ethnocentrism are human universals,” writes Greene.

What that means is that once you leave the setting of a small group and start dealing with multiple groups, there’s a reversal of field in morality. Suddenly, you can’t trust your emotions or gut settings any longer. “When it comes to us versus them, with different groups that have different feelings about things like gay marriage, or Obamacare, or Israelies versus Palestinians, our gut reactions are the source of the problem,” says Greene. From an evolutionary perspective, morality is built to make groups cohere, not to achieve world peace.

4. Morality varies regionally and culturally. This is further exacerbated by the fact that in different cultures and in different groups, there is subtle (and sometimes, not-so-subtle) variation in moral norms, making outside groups seem tougher to understand and sympathize with.

Take, again, the Public Goods Game. People play it differently around the world, Greene reports. The most cooperative people (that have been studied, at least) live in Boston and Copenhagen; they make high contributions in the game almost from the start, and stay that way. By contrast, in Athens and Riyadh, it’s the opposite pattern: People contribute low and this doesn’t change (in this version of the game, free riders are allowed to punish cooperators too, and this seems to account for the outcome). There are also a variety of cities in between, like Seoul and Melbourne, where contributions start out moderate or low and trend higher as free riders are punished and norms get enforced. “There are very different expectations in different places about what the terms of cooperation are,” Greene says. “About what people, especially strangers, owe each other.” (It is important to note that Greene does not attribute these regional differences to evolution or genetics; they’re cultural.)

5. Your brain is not in favor of the greatest good for the greatest number. In addition to the Public Goods Game, Greene and colleagues also experiment with a scenario called the “trolley dilemma,” described above. So what do people do when asked whether it is moral to take one life in order to save five?

The footbridge dilemmaJohn Holbo/Flickr
The answer is that for the most part, people placed in this hypothetical dilemma choose utilitarianism, or the greatest good for the greatest number. They say they want to divert the train, sacrificing one person to save five.

However, things become very different when instead of the standard trolley dilemma, researchers substitute a variant called the “footbridge dilemma,” illustrated at right. Now, the trolley is barreling down the track again, but you’re in a different position: Atop a bridge over the tracks, alongside a large man. The only way to stop the train is to push him off the bridge, onto the tracks in front of it. The man is big enough to stop the train, and so once again, you’ll save five lives by sacrificing one. The math is exactly the same, but people respond very differently—mostly, they just won’t push the man or say it is okay to do so. “So the question is,” Greene says, “why do we say it’s okay to trade one life to save five here, but not there?”

Greene and fellow researchers looked to neuroscience to find out. It turns out that the two dilemmas activate different parts of the brain, and “there’s an emotional response that makes most people say no to pushing the guy off the footbridge, that competes with the utilitarian rationale,” Greene says. However, this is not true in certain patients with damage to certain regions of the brain. People with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, a part of the brain that processes emotions, are more likely to treat the two dilemmas in the same way, and make more utilitarian decisions. Meanwhile, when people do make utilitarian judgments in the trolley dilemma, Greene’s research suggests that their brains shift out of an emotional and automatic mode and into a more deliberative mode, activating different brain regions associated with conscious control.

6. Humanity may, objectively, be becoming more moral. Based on many experiments with Public Goods Games, trolleys, and other scenarios, Greene has come to the conclusion that we can only trust gut-level morality to do so much. Uncomfortable scenarios like the footbridge dilemma notwithstanding, he believes that something like utilitarianism, which he defines as “maximize happiness impartially,” is the only moral approach that can work with a vast, complex world comprised of many different groups of people.

But to get there, Greene says, requires the moral version of a gut override on the part of humanity—a shift to “manual mode,” as he puts it.

The surprise, then, is that he’s actually pretty optimistic. It is far easier now than it ever was, Greene says, to be aware that your moral obligations don’t end where your small group ends. We all saw this very recently, with the global response to the devastation caused by Super Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. We’re just more conscious, in general, of what is happening to people very distant from us. What’s more, intergroup violence seems to be on the decline. Here Greene cites the recent work of his Harvard colleague Steven Pinker, who has documented a long-term decline of violence across the world in modern times.

To be more moral, then, Greene believes that we must first grasp the limits of the moral instincts that come naturally to us. That’s hard to do, but he thinks it gets collectively easier.

“There’s a bigger us that’s growing,” Greene says. “Wherever you go, there are tribal forces that oppose that larger us. But, the larger us is growing.”

Job Destroying Technology

Wonkblog

Eight ways robots stole our jobs in 2013

BY LYDIA DEPILLIS
December 23 at 10:01 am
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201 Comments
If we talked about nothing else in 2013 — and, all right, 2012, too — we talked about the question of whether technology is going to take all our jobs. This latest surge of the age-old debate seems to have abated, for now, with the anti-robot contingent in America somewhat mollified by the promise that additional automation may be the one advance that allows for manufacturing jobs to return from overseas and relieves humans of the most dangerous and unpleasant tasks. Theoretically, the robotic gospel goes, that talent is then freed up for more fulfilling and productive work. (Hint: The more “creative” and “social” you are, the more likely you are to survive.)
Either way, it’s worth looking at the different ways automation began rendering new classes of jobs obsolete this year.
Amazon’s new robots don’t go on strike. (Kiva Systems)
Amazon’s new robots don’t go on strike. (Kiva Systems)

1. The people who mail stuff
Back in 2012, Amazon acquired Kiva Systems, a maker of robots that can be programmed to pick up online orders in a warehouse and shuttle them to their departure points. The company now has 1,382 of the machines in three fulfillment centers, which means it eventually may not even have to hire the tens of thousands of temp workers it brings on for the busy holiday season. And if you had any doubts that Amazon could eventually do the same with flying drones, well, let this be a lesson. (Amazon chief executive Jeffrey P. Bezos owns The Washington Post.)
Burger to go, no human needed. (Momentum Machines)
Burger to go, no human needed. (Momentum Machines)

2. The people who reheat pre-cooked food
The nationwide fast-food strikes brought dire warnings from restaurant industry-backed researchers that if line cooks cost too much, they could easily be replaced by robots. That hasn’t quite happened yet, but at least one company is working diligently to make it possible. It’s reasonable to believe that McDonalds — which is already replacing cashiers with touch screens in Europe — would jump at the chance.
American Giant’s offerings, available on a website near you. (American Giant)
American Giant’s offerings, available on a website near you. (American Giant)

3. The people who sell clothes
E-commerce has been steadily eating away at brick-and-mortar stores for years now, but what’s been cropping up more recently is a breed of business that sees taking retail out of the picture as a point of pride. American Giant, for example: The purveyor of basic, high-quality clothing makes its stuff just outside San Francisco, which it can do affordably because it sells to in-the-know urban sophisticates purely online, skipping the American Apparel-style marketing blitz altogether. That may mean you can get a high-quality, U.S.-made hoodie for a competitive price. It also means that the people who might otherwise have sold it to you don’t have jobs.
4. The people who stock shelves and return shopping carts
Not all labor-saving innovations are high-tech. The discount supermarket Aldi — which is owned by the same corporate parent as the more bourgeois Trader Joe’s — keeps payroll down by requiring a 25-cent deposit for shopping carts so employees don’t have to return them, and stocking shelves with boxes full of goods rather than placing the individual items in neat rows. Again, great for shoppers on a budget — at the cost of employment.
5. People who drive trucks
Autonomous vehicle technology is accelerating, and for now, is focused on passenger vehicles. But the real labor shortage is in long-haul trucking, and as my colleague Brian Fung pointed out, that’s a job that might be more safely filled by a remotely-controlled robot that never gets tired or lost. Which just means that the 5.7 million people who do the job now will have to find a new way to make a living.
The human-less tractor. (Autonomous Tractor Company)
The human-less tractor. (Autonomous Tractor Company)

6. People who operate farm equipment
The history of agriculture has been one long tale of automation, to the point where almost nobody works on farms in America anymore. The exception was supposed to be people who operated the machines that replaced people who tilled the soil and harvested the crops by hand. But even they’re not safe anymore, with the advent of tractors that can be piloted around the fields by computer or even programmed with the right coordinates and set loose, like a gigantic dirt-treading Roomba.
7. The people who make iProducts
After years of close scrutiny for the working conditions in its factories, Foxconn — which makes most of Apple’s computers, phones, and tablets — decided to swap people out for machines as much as possible. The process hasn’t been as quick or as easy as anticipated, but with wages rising in China, Foxconn has little choice but to keep cranking out the one-million-strong army of “Foxbots” it promised back in 2010.
8. The people who do low-level lab work
In North Carolina’s Research Triangle Park, a company called LabCorp is hard at work developing machines to sort and split blood samples, which is just one of hundreds of thousands of menial laboratory jobs that pay decent money but could more efficiently be done by robots.
We may be able to add bartenders next year, but at this point, it still seems that man has an advantage over machines in making a decent Manhattan.

Lydia DePillis
Lydia DePillis is a reporter focusing on business policy, including lobbying, government contracting, and international trade, with a bit of urban affairs and infrastructure on the side. She was previously a staff writer at The New Republic and the Washington City Paper. Email her here and follow her on Twitter here.

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Americans are buying less electricity. That’s a big problem for utilities.

Celebrating Shakespeare

Merrie Christmas
Celebrating Shakespeare

Dec 24th 2013, 11:15 by M.S.L.J.

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DESPITE the fact that his plays were often performed during the festive period, William Shakespeare has surprisingly little to say on the subject of Christmas. The opening scene of “Love’s Labours Lost” does suggest, however, the importance of specifically seasonal celebration: “At Christmas I no more desire a rose | Than wish a snow in May’s new-fangled mirth”. Similarly, many still enjoy the fires and hearty food of Christmas in colder climates.

Shakespeare will himself be celebrated in the coming year as 2014 marks the 450th anniversary of his birth. Emma Hogan, Britain correspondent for The Economist, rounds up below many of the weird and wacky events being put on for the playwright:

“At the Folger Library in Washington, DC, which holds the world’s largest Shakespeare collection, a first folio of the Bard’s plays will be on show. In Paris a week-long conference will bring together academics, directors and actors in April. Performances will happen alongside readings and exhibitions in museums and in the national library. Britain will hold a “Shakespeare Week” in March. More than 1,000 schools will take part, as will theatres, cinemas and museums.”

Shakespeare will also make his digital mark thanks to a New York theatre company, Shakespeare Exchange. It will publish online videos of each of the writer’s 154 sonnets, performed by 154 actors, in the run-up to April 23rd (the bard’s birthday—famous for also being the day upon which he died in 1616).

As Ms Hogan points out, however, perhaps the best way to observe Shakespeare’s 450th will be to see his plays staged:

“In Britain several productions will compete for attention. In January a performance of “King Lear” at the National Theatre will star Simon Russell Beale, who is also directing the play. In February the team behind “War Horse” will bring a puppet version of “A Midsummer Night’s Dream” to the Barbican.”

Perhaps those wanting tickets can quickly add them to lists being left for Father Christmas tonight…

What are Standardized Tests Good For?

Standardized Achievement Tests: What Are They Good For? Hint: Not Cognitive Ability.
By Scott Barry Kaufman | December 20, 2013 |

It’s well known that good standardized test takers also tend to have high cognitive ability. That’s not a shocker.

But until recently, very little research has looked at the effect of improving standardized achievement test performance. This is obviously a really important question, since we are so steeped in a standardized testing culture. Wouldn’t it be nice to know what all this obsessive teaching to the test is really good for?

A new study makes it clear what growth in standardized test performance doesn’t buy us: cognitive ability.

Amy Finn, John Gabrieli, and colleagues at MIT, Brown, and Harvard looked at standardized test scores (Math and English language arts) and cognitive ability (working memory, processing speed, and abstract reasoning) among nearly 1,400 8th graders attending traditional, exam, and charter public schools in Boston.

Here are the highlights:

There was a substantial correlation between standardized test scores and cognitive ability. In other words, good test takers already tend to have high levels of working memory, processing speed, and abstract reasoning skills.
Cognitive ability was associated with growth in achievement test scores from 4th to 8th grade. This is consistent with prior research suggesting that cognitive ability predicts academic achievement, but academic achievement does not predict cognitive ability.
The school a student attended, and the quality of education they received, played little role in the growth of cognitive ability.
The school a student attended, and the quality of education they received, did play a role in the growth of standardized achievement test scores.
Students attending a charter school as a result of winning the admissions lottery had higher standardized test scores compared to students who lost the lottery.
There was no difference between the lottery groups, however, on measures of cognitive ability.
Why does this matter? Well, there are various ways of looking at this.

If standardized testing is your thing, you’ll be comforted to know that the results are promising that achievement test scores can be improved, and quality of instruction does have an impact on test scores.

If cognitive ability is more your thing, you might be a bit disappointed to see that schools aren’t doing a good job boosting particular cognitive skills. That might be troublesome, considering the importance of fluid reasoning and executive functioning (such as working memory and cognitive inhibition) for a wide range of important life outcomes, including school performance, drug use, crime, and achieving virtually any goal you have in life. As the researchers point out, there are examples of targeted programs that increase cognitive control and reasoning. It just looks like teaching to the standardized tests isn’t going cut it.

But me? I’m not really all that hot and bothered by standardized testing or cognitive ability testing. Don’t get me wrong: I recognize the importance of assessing content knowledge and the importance of holding lots of information in your mind at one time.

But I’m not convinced any of that should be the top priority of education. What about deep, meaningful learning that students will remember the rest of their lives? That connects the material to their own personal lives, and the lives of others? What about helping students learn about themselves, and their identity? Or helping them find their unique passions and inclinations, and cultivating that through engagement in personally meaningful projects?

Sorry if I’m getting ahead of myself here. I do think the question “Does growth in standardized achievement test scores buy you higher cognitive ability?” is an important one.

But I think an equally important question is: “Should we even be standardizing minds in the first place?”

You can read the paper here. Here is the supplement.

© 2013 Scott Barry Kaufman, All Rights Reserved

Narcolepsy Confirmed as Autoimmune Disease

Narcolepsy Confirmed as Autoimmune Disease
The new results also partly explain why the 2009 swine flu virus and a vaccine against it led to spikes in the sleep disorder

By Ed Yong and Nature magazine

As the H1N1 swine flu pandemic swept the world in 2009, China saw a spike in cases of narcolepsy — a mysterious disorder that involves sudden, uncontrollable sleepiness. Meanwhile, in Europe, around 1 in 15,000 children who were given Pandemrix — a now-defunct flu vaccine that contained fragments of the pandemic virus — also developed narcolepsy, a chronic disease.

Immunologist Elizabeth Mellins and narcolepsy researcher Emmanuel Mignot at Stanford University School of Medicine in California and their collaborators have now partly solved the mystery behind these events, while also confirming a longstanding hypothesis that narcolepsy is an autoimmune disease, in which the immune system attacks healthy cells.

Narcolepsy is mostly caused by the gradual loss of neurons that produce hypocretin, a hormone that keeps us awake. Many scientists had suspected that the immune system was responsible, but the Stanford team has found the first direct evidence: a special group of CD4+ T cells (a type of immune cell) that targets hypocretin and is found only in people with narcolepsy.

“Up till now, the idea that narcolepsy was an autoimmune disorder was a very compelling hypothesis, but this is the first direct evidence of auto-immunity,” says Mellins. “I think these cells are a smoking gun.” The study is published today in Science Translational Medicine.

Thomas Scammell, a neurologist at Harvard Medical School in Boston, Massachusetts, says that the results are welcome after “years of modest disappointment”, marked by many failures to find antibodies made by a person’s body against their own hypocretin. “It’s one of the biggest things to happen in the narcolepsy field for some time.”

Loose ends
It is not clear why some people make these T cells and others do not, but genetics may play a part. In earlier work, Mignot showed that 98% of people with narcolepsy have a variant of the gene HLA that is found in only 25% of the general population.

Environmental factors, such as infections, probably matter too. Mellins’ working model is that narcolepsy happens when people with a genetic predisposition, which involves having several narcolepsy-related gene variants, encounter an environmental factor that mimics hypocretin, triggering a response from the immune system. The 2009 H1N1 virus was one such trigger: the team found that these same special CD4+ T cells also recognize a protein from the pandemic H1N1 virus.

Narcolepsy of course was around long before the 2009 pandemic. And since new cases of the disease tend to arise right after winter — following the seasonal peak in flu — it’s possible that other strains or even other viruses are involved, too.

But the results do not fully explain the Pandemrix mystery, because other flu vaccines contained the same proteins but did not lead to a spike in narcolepsy cases. Regardless, Mellins says that it should be possible to avoid repeating the same mistake by ensuring that future flu vaccines do not contain components that resemble hypocretin.

Another loose end is that “they don’t show how these T cells are actually killing the hypocretin neurons”, adds Scammell. “It’s like a murder mystery and we don’t know who the real killer is.” He thinks that it is unlikely that the T cells are the true culprits; instead, they could be acting through an intermediary, or might merely be a symptom of some other destructive event.

“The results are very important, but they need to do a replication study in a large group of patients and controls,” says Gert Lammers, a neurologist at Leiden University Medical Center in the Netherlands and president of the European Narcolepsy Network. “If the findings are confirmed, the first important spin-off might be the development of a new diagnostic test.”

This article is reproduced with permission from the magazine Nature. The article was first published on December 18, 2013.